Introduction
“Collective leadership” has long been a key organizational principle and policy making mechanism for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It means shared responsibility for running and guiding an institution according to established norms. Collective leadership is aimed at promoting institutional cohesion, concord and effectiveness. The principles of collective leadership are, accordingly, stipulated in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Constitution of the Communist Party of China (CCP), and other specific statutes. According to the Party Constitution, Party committees at all levels must operate on the principle of combining collective leadership with individual responsibility based on division of labor. All major issues shall be decided upon by the Party committees after discussion in accordance with the principle of collective leadership.1 When discussing and making decisions on any matter, Party organizations must follow the principle of subordination of the minority to the majority. “A vote must be taken when major issues are decided on. ... No leader is allowed to make arbitrary decisions or to place himself/ herself above the Party organization.”2 Since 1996, the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection has reiterated repeatedly that all Party institutions must “conscientiously implement the principle of democratic centralism, and leadership cohesion and collective leadership.” Other Party’s regulations aslo specify that major policy decisions such as key personnel appointments, big construction projects and the use of large amounts of money must be made collectively.3
If these rules and principals were faithfully enacted, it would have been less likely to see power manipulation and abuse. However, the reality is far less rosy than what the Party envisioned. In fact, the Chinese political system is characterized by overconcentration of power into the hands of the First-in-Command (FIC, or yibaoshou in Chinese), which has contributed to the prevalence of corruption among leading Party and state officials in the country. The first-in-command corruption in China provides strong evidence in support of the famous Lord Action adage (1887) that “power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely”.4 It is also in line with Charles Louis de Secondat Montesquieu’s observation that “any man who has power is led to abuse it; he continues until he finds limits.”5
FIC corruption has caught the attention of many scholars in China. He Zengke points out, for instance, that “the prevalence of FIC corruption reveals the overcentralization of power and deficiency of the current leadership system.” [7]. Scholars agree in general that political power in China tends to concentrate into one position, thereby resulting in FIC corruption. In their research, however, overcentralization of power remains as a vague concept wit